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Abstract

The Impact of the Transition from Analog to Digital Process Display Gauges
on Human Error and Safety in the Chemical Industry

Allen J. Thacker

The use of new technological instruments in the work place has enabled operators to
control processes and product development to tolerances that were unachievable in past
decades. The chemical industry has exhibited rapid growth in the implementation of control
monitoring instruments such as analog and digital display gauges as well as the software
applications that provide the flexibility to successfully integrate the technology into the
chemical manufacturing processes. This research was designed to examine the effects of the
transition from analog displays to digital displays in the chemical industry. The results of the
research provide benefits to chemical manufacturers and their safety programs. The
significant findings in this research provided evidence that the continuing transition from
digital to analog display gauges has made a negative impact on the safety incidence rate.
These findings suggested that chemical plant operators, while being required to complete
more tasks in the same amount of time, exhibited various difficulties in working with digital
display gauges. These suggested difficulties manifested themselves in the increased number
of reported “ Human Error” incident events.
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Chapter I
Introduction
Industry in Transition
The measurement of quantities relating to volumes, areas, distance, time, rate of
change, and time and space has concerned man through the millennia. The ancients were
preoccupied with the passage of time and developed various devices to calculate the time of
day, month, and year for both religious and agrarian purposes. The ability to measure time
provided a progressive reference “ location” to past events and future events. Static measures
such as weight, volume, and distance were developed as it became necessary to understand
and use comparisons with known and unknown quantities. The ability to consistently
compare against known standards helped in determining the value of artifacts and material
substances or information about the condition of something for religious, commercial, and/or
strategic purposes. Information, and the ability to interpret it correctly and consistently, was
considered to be a valuable strategic commodity in all aspects of life. Those persons who
could provide this information were highly regarded within their respective communities even
though they were not immune to error in their interpretations.
In modern times, the “ human operator” or “ system interpreter” (human system
interface) has now become an increasingly weaker link in the process system. New
technology often fails to deliver the promised benefits, and may instead introduce new
demands and complexities into an already exacting field of practice. In order to cope with
these new conditions, people often adapt either the technology or their way of using it in ways
not anticipated by designers (Roth, Bennett, & Woods, 1987; Cook, Woods, & Howie, 1990;
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Hutchins, 1990). Technological artifacts, or tools, both shape user strategies and are shaped
by their users.
In today’s chemical industry, system measurement and data collection functions
influence many characteristics critical to the industrial process and environment. These
characteristics include but were not limited to the measurement of substances with reference
to temperatures, pressures, volumes, and flow. All of these measures were normally
calibrated to an industry standard or a developed process parameter. Regardless of how
complicated the control process was, the objective remains the same as it was in ancient
times; correctness, consistency, and economy of resources. Within modern processes, the
economy of resources had been expanded to include process safety and environmental
concerns.
As the risks to the process and environment increased, the need for accurate data
interpretation and response to these conditions also increased. With each technological
advance, system information and interpretation became complicated to the point where
response times for human interaction/decision opportunities require increasingly narrower
parameters for safe and predictable operations. A good “ human-system interface” was
required in order for processes to be reliable, repeatable, and safe. Proper training had always
been a corollary to good human-system interface design in system processes to reduce the
impact of “ human error” .
This study provided insight into technological influences and developments of
“ instrumentation processes and displays” during the last 20 years within the chemical
industry. The focus of this study was to review and assess existing incident data and
determine the impact that instrumentation processes and display format changes have had on
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human error. Anecdotal information discussed the nature of the effects that human errors,
caused by display formats, had on the chemical industry in the areas of process safety, system
training, government mandated regulations, and on other legislative rule-making bodies.
Tullis (1980) provided a basis for this research question with an observation suggesting that
frequent training may provide operators with the necessary skills and abilities to overcome
deficiencies/decrements in proper digital display responses as compared to proper analog
display responses.

Emerging Industry Processes
The history of tools can be interpreted as a history of amplification, first of muscle
power (e.g., the lever or the pulley), then of perception (e.g., microscopes and telescopes), and
then of regulation and control (e.g., automatic controllers and servomechanisms). Before the
1950s, tools were primarily designed to facilitate physical or mechanical work.
Developments in computing technology had made it possible to develop tools for cognitive or
mental work. For years many organizations have experienced difficulties in turning
technological developments into systems that actually improved performance in the target
field (e.g., space, air traffic control, chemical plant control rooms, communication network
management, ground satellite control stations) (Hollenagel, Cacciabue, 1999).
Information systems prior to the advent of electrical/pneumatic sensing devices relied
heavily on employees/operators visually reading gauges, charts, and/or physically measuring
various process levels. Typically the gathered data was further processed and/or archived for
future use via manual operations. The development of human-machine systems as outlined
by Kragt, (1983) was briefly described by the three following characteristic stages:

3

•

Manual Control was the first stage where simple physical measurements
(pressures, temperatures) were displayed directly, according to the "one sensor
- one indicator" principle. Initially, control and maneuvering was done locally,
with direct reading of instruments and manipulation of single components
(valves and switches). Later, measurements were gradually collected on local
instrument boards for the single machine or group of machines, but equipment
was still manipulated directly. Operators were used as if they were just
another piece of equipment to support the functions of the machine in a closed
loop. The machine was primarily an amplifier of human physical strength and
precision, and tasks mainly consisted of observation, detection, manual control
and operation, with few demands to process tuning or fault management.

•

Supervisory Control was the next stage. Technological developments
increased the complexity of the machines and consequently the demands on the
operator. When the demands to precision, speed, and sustained attention
exceeded human capacity, manual control tasks were taken over by
automation. Rather than being a part of the machine or the process, the
operators gradually became supervisors that were supposed to step in when
things went wrong. The tasks were generally part of the supervision and
adjustment of a control system consisting of state recognition, fault finding,
and scheduling of tasks during start-up and shutdown sequences and process
tuning.
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•

Cognitive Control is the present stage where humans and machines have
increasingly come to be seen as a whole, a joint human-machine system, even
though this is far from being achieved in every system design. More extensive
automation has removed the operator even further from the actual process.
Work is now mediated by information technology and allocated between
humans and machines according to the nature of the process (and its physical
implementation) rather than considerations of joint human-machine system
functioning. It has now become necessary to provide a rigid process design for
the human-machine system. A typical design based on a “ top-down” hierarchy
of analysis exposes the importance of the operator's performance envelope. In
most process design cases however, efforts are limited to avoid exceeding the
performance envelope under normal operating conditions, rather than
preventing human error under upset or emergency conditions.
As described in the manual control scenario, the operator's task in many instances was

to visit the equipment and gain a "Real Time" perspective regarding the performance of the
ongoing processes. This interaction had an added advantage in that it provided a level of
assurance from a production standpoint that critical processes, for instance, were operating
within specified guidelines. Also from this perspective, safety aspects of the processes were
included in the observational reports.
These safety aspects consisted of a combination of process knowledge and knowledge
of equipment limitations including the functions of "over temperature" devices, pressure
relieving devices, speed sensors/governors, flow indicators, and high or low level alarms.
Operational procedures dictated that the operators have the ability to read and evaluate an
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analog display at the location of the equipment. In some instances, several outputs were
required to be read for a considered course of action. The interpretation of the outputs and
resulting proper response was directly contingent on the ability of the human operator to
process the information and react. The correct interpretation of the data was the only safety
barrier between the observed process and the welfare of employees in the immediate area.
Therefore training and constant monitoring of the process was essential. These same types of
decision events could have been applied to driving an automobile, flying an airplane, or
operating any piece of machinery that required the interpretation of a set of data followed by a
proper response or action.

Modern Processes Development
The need for accurate measures of dynamic conditions and processes became apparent
as economies began to emerge early in the Industrial Revolution. These measures included
temperature, length, pressure, flow, speed, and a refinement of time. The standardization of
units of measures continued up through the mid 1950’s and 1960’s. Acceptance of these
standardized units began to accelerate as competitive world markets emerged.
The increased demand for a better quality and larger volumes of products throughout
the 20th century brought about a need for improved human-interface systems. In the chemical
industry in particular, it was discovered that the ability to replicate certain chemical
compounds and materials to exacting specifications guaranteed a profit base and allowed the
producer of the products to acquire patents for those processes.
As design requirements for the processes and equipment were better understood, more
advanced engineering methods emerged and were employed to assure that effective control
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designs and efficiencies were maximized. To maintain system safety, chemical processes
relied heavily on the integrity of the mechanical equipment used in the processes along with
operators, the human-interface system, to accurately monitor, assimilate, synthesize, and
interpret system data for proper response or action if required.
Designers soon found that processes could have been further refined and modified,
using existing equipment, by incorporating advanced technologies that eliminated some of the
human interface capabilities. With increasing frequency the operator’s role from a “ hands-on
perspective” in the chemical process began to diminish when control schemes were updated
and retrofitted and the system became more sophisticated. Increased levels of sophistication
often required that the focus on the human-interface function be concentrated in the areas of
process safety and operator training in order to reduce the potential for human error.
Within the last 20 years industrial process information tracking and data gathering
systems continued to change dramatically. Companies such as OSI/Witco, I.E. DuPont, and
G.E. Plastics introduced a "Central Control" technology to augment Distributive Control
System (DCS) designs in their respective chemical plant processes. These systems were
analogous in that they provided a central location for all process data to be recorded,
analyzed, synthesized, and responded to when necessary. Instrumentation manufactures such
as Bailey Controls, Allen Bradley, Omega, Westinghouse, and GE, continually provided the
chemical industry with new and improved process monitoring devices.
Advantages of the DCS system included the remoteness of the control process from
the process equipment with one central location for related processes. Proponents of this type
of system also suggested that there was greater safety for the operators should there be an
upset condition, direct data comparison from several related processes. The convenience of
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fewer process operators within an otherwise congested area (less distractions) also enhanced
the system design (Pedersen, Lind, 1999). However, the physical remoteness from the actual
process equipment offered a distinct disadvantage in that the remoteness results in the
inability to respond, as illustrated in the manual control scenario, to situations that required
the presence of an operator in the immediate area. Other disadvantages included the reliance
on data "communicated" to the control center by lines, cables, and radio frequencies and the
idiosyncrasies associated with each method of communication.
Improved information tracking and data gathering systems became more reliant on
digital signal input and digital data output rather than the analog devices that performed
similar functions. These devices gained popularity due to the ease of input or output
generation and data transmission as opposed to the physical “ link” required by analog
instrumentation. Digital systems also had the ability to present operators and engineers with
more detailed display information for control responses.
The impact of the potential for human error was not originally a major focus or
consideration in the design phases of the transition to digital equipment display and layout.
More particularly initial system training did not regard “ situation awareness” as an important
consideration in the design of safety and process training scenarios (Tullis, 1980).
One major chemical manufacturer in the upper Mid-Ohio Valley implemented a "Hard
Wire" system in combination with Radio Frequency Transmission (RF) that allowed, part of
or all, data to be transmitted to and from control rooms and process equipment via digital
signals and fiber optic cables. The operator’s function was to merely observe the process and
intervene if an undesired condition presented itself. This was very similar to the cognitive
control scenario.
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To further enhance control systems a "Statistical Process Control" (SPC) system
(Wheeler, Chambers, 1992) was introduced to provide a statistically acceptable operational
range for the process and provide a level of situational awareness. This type of system would
include control processes such as the “ 6-Sigma” design. The 6-Sigma design permitted the
system designers to set a predetermined “ operational range” for the process based on previous
data and equipment capability. The desired operational range always fell within one standard
deviation of optimum conditions based on data collected from similar processes or direct
observations of the targeted process. Excursions from one standard deviation were allowed,
provided that the frequency and magnitude was within preset tolerances. For example, if
during the process observation it was noted that there were seven excursions either above or
below the one standard deviation of optimum operational limits, the process would be
designated as an “ out of control” process. This condition may or may not have been a cause
for action other than resetting the equipment or determining the source of the problem. Using
an empirical statistical model, 68% (plus or minus one standard deviation) of all data would
have been within the operational limits, 95% of all data would be within plus or minus two
standard deviations, and if the process was shut down for emergency reasons while still
recording data or experienced a “ runaway” reaction it would have been considered within plus
or minus three standard deviations. The latter condition would have typically caused alarms
to sound and emergency procedures to be enacted. Three standard deviations above or below
the optimum process base line gave the control scheme its generic name, “ 6-Sigma Process” .
SPC systems have been developed primarily to replace or augment the "decision
making" process for larger complicated systems and critical process manufacturing. The SPC
system incorporates "Software" which, along with added hardware devices, provides a level
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of flexibility to adapt to existing measuring and data transmission schemes (Wheeler,
Chambers, 1992). Coupled with a central DCS, operators had the potential to synthesize more
information at faster rates. The SPC system also provided trending data in the process
dynamic which in turn augmented a level of situational awareness.
Consolidated Aluminum's "Bens Run Recycling Plant" at Bens Run, West Virginia
discovered that operator's were not capable of making consistently accurate decisions with
equipment that had more that 10 data (input/output) points. A process furnace at this plant,
designed with 23 separate data points, was modified in 1991 to combine the functions of a
SPC package and a GE/Fanuc Series 6 Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). This
modification allowed the "critical" decision making processes to be less traumatic for the
operators in an "upset" process condition (Rasmussen, 1986).

Operator Training
The combination of these systems in various facilities had provided many
opportunities for industry to refine processes and have better control of operations (Mullet,
Sano, 1994). Companies, however, have not been completely successful in the "operator
transitioning / training" to the new processes and control systems. This lack of success had
been due, in part, to the focus on the design stage of the new processes. Comprehensive
training in the new processes with emphasis on cognitive skills has not been a major
consideration as the equipment and programs have been introduced to the process control
environment.
The need for a higher level of skill training for the operators also was not consistently
recognized as a priority when these systems were originally put in place. This trend
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continued, but as natural and cyclical attrition along with retirements in the workforce took
place, specific training designed for existing control systems was more frequently
implemented for new employees/operators. Designers and administrators originally
visualized these automated control systems as enhancements that were " much easier to
operate". Full consideration was not given to the impact of “ Human Factors” in safety,
training deficiencies, response degradations, and other cognitive constraints on the operator.

Current Statistics
The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) released the following
general statistics on commercial chemical incidents for a 10-year period beginning in 1987.
The report was a comprehensive collection and consolidation of data from 5 major federal
reporting agencies and covered all areas except marine oil spills. The report contained 10.1
million incident reports and the principal findings were:

•

Chemical incidents were recorded in 95% of the nearly 3,300
counties within the United States.

•

Of 605,000 unique incidents, 42% occurred at fixed locations
(chemical plants) and 43% were transportation related.

•

About 1.6% of the incidents resulted in death or injury; 0.7% resulted
in evacuations of workers or public; 27.1% resulted in property
damage.

•

Over the 10-year period, there were 2,565 deaths and 22,949 injuries
reported.
11

•

All states experienced chemical incidents, but seven states accounted
for nearly one half of the total –California, Texas, Ohio, New York,
Illinois, Michigan, and Louisiana.

•

Incidents were most frequently reported for chemical manufacturing
and fuel companies.

•

Gasoline was the chemical most often involved and there were 45
other chemicals involved with 1,000 or more incidents.

•

Mechanical failures were cited as leading to 40% of the incidents
and human factors were cited in 27% of the reports. Natural
phenomena accounted for an additional 1% and the remainder, 32%
were attributed to unknown initiating events (National Safety Council
Injury Facts, 1999).

When asked for assistance in data gathering techniques, specifically “ Does data exist
that might provide a more focused review of the published National Safety Council facts
regarding display effects on human error and incident rates,” Mr. Phil Cogan stated “ I doubt
very much that this data exists (P. Cogan, personal communication, August 30, 2001). For
one thing, there is no reliable data either on the total number of incidents, and, even less on
“ near misses” . Data on digital displays and their effects is even less likely to exist” .

Problem Statement
The problem of this research was to determine what impact the transition from analog
to digital process display gauges had on human error and safety in the chemical industry.
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Purpose of the Research
The purposes of this research were to provide:
1.

Focused quantitative safety data for process engineers, instrumentation manufacturers,
and safety managers.

2.

A determination of contributing factors for instrumentation display misinterpretation
and response degradation as related to human error in chemical process operator
functions.

3.

Assistance in data identification that will facilitate training program development for
safety professionals in correcting operator “ response degradation” .

4.

Areas of training focus designed to enhance “ situational awareness” for the
interpretation of digital display outputs.

Research Hypotheses
It was hypothesized that the transition from analog to digital display gauges in the chemical
industry had no impact on the safety incidence rate at a .05 significance level.

Assumptions
The following assumptions were made in this research:
Digital displays continued to displace analog displays in industry.
Data reporting agencies accurately monitored the chemical manufacturing industry.
The order of the data collection and research did not affect the outcomes.
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Limitations
The limitations of this research were:
1.

This research was limited to data made available by the selected reporting entities.

2.

Data reporting entities for publication and information dissemination were in
compliance with all legislative, professional association, and industry standard
practices guidelines.

3.

Data collection was limited to the actual years investigated.

4.

Databases used in collecting incident statistics were not all inclusive.

5.

Data collected from individual chemical companies was proprietary.

Procedure
The following steps were included in the data gathering and data analysis process for this
research:
•

Solicited and received permission from selected individual chemical manufacturers to
review incident and training records prior to the conversion and after the conversion to
digital gauges.

•

Conducted literature research of prior studies and literature specific to instrumentation
displays, industrial process training, process emergency procedures, process safety
management, human factors, and control room design.

•

Conducted research of incident statistics and specific industry events whose impact on
the safety of all personnel was directly affected by the ability to properly respond to
control display indications.
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Databases & Internet Sites used for background data reference included:
United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
National Safety Council (NSC)
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (HFES)
•

Conducted literature search in the fields of human factors, human error in

manufacturing domains, chemical plant safety records, chemical plant safety history,
chemical plant operator safety training. The literature review provided anecdotal
reference to historical chemical plant incident events, identified causes and effects of
display misinterpretation, and human error in the chemical industry as it related
specifically to digital display misinterpretation.
Literature search included:
Peer reviewed journal articles
Professional periodicals relating to specific major events
Accident summaries
Individual chemical companies
•

Analyzed and synthesized collected data germane to the research topic in order to
determine incidence frequency with relationship to human error and misinterpretation
of display information.

•

Statistical analysis was conducted using an ANOVA on the gathered incidence
frequency data to determine if a statistically significant relationship at the .05 level
existed between misinterpretation of display information and display format.

•

An incidence frequency was established for events to determine if a significant
relationship existed between the total number of human error events causing injury,
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death, or chemical release and the number of human error events due to display
misinterpretation (analog) causing injury, death, or chemical releases.
•

An incidence frequency was established for events to determine if a significant
relationship existed between the total number of human error events causing injury,
death, or chemical release and the number of human error events due to display
misinterpretation (digital) causing injury, death, or chemical releases.

•

Recommendations for training and further research were stated.

Definition of Terms
The following terms and definitions were used in this research:
Analog Display. A system of visual measurement display in which continuously varying
values are represented by hands, dials, and sounds to indicate numerical amounts.
Cognition. For the purposes of this research cognition was defined as the process or state of
possessing, knowing, or recognizing, either visually or audibly, perception and judgmental
abilities. The ability to visually process information in order to judge.
Digital Display. Digital displays are indicators of visual measurement in which continuously
varying values are represented and displayed as numerical symbols to indicate numerical
amounts.
Human Error. Was defined as any lapse in situation awareness, action, response, or
interpretation as a result of a data display output or indication that was incorrect whether or
not it resulted in an incident causing injury, product or property damage, or unwanted release
of a material.
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Hysteresis Effect. The "Lag" time between the event indicated in the display and the initiation
of a proper response to the indication.
Incidence / Incidence Rate The Incidence and Incidence Rate were used interchangeably and
defined for purposes of this research as those incidents or relevant events that had been
factored as a proportional ratio to the man-hours worked at the researched facilities. The
Incidence Rate was based on the Occupational Safety and Health Administrations’ formula.
Incident / Event. For purposes of this research the term incident or event referred to any
abnormal or upset event that was involved with a chemical manufacturing process that caused
or had the potential to cause injury, illness, death, or property damage to manufacturing
personnel, neighboring population, or the environment.
PSIG. Was defined as Pounds per Square Inch Gauge.
Response. Was defined in this research as the action or lack of action as a result of a
cognitive process.
Situation Awareness. For purposes of this research situation awareness was defined as the
ability of a chemical plant operator to maintain a point of reference with regard to the safety
of the process and all associated personnel while interpreting and correctly responding to
multiple data displays relative to the process.
Transformational Loads. The additional activities that required a synthesis of indicated output
information in order to properly respond to a monitored task.
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Chapter II
Review of Literature
Introduction
This chapter contains descriptions and references to instrumentation display research,
safety considerations, and emergency procedures, as well as human factor design
considerations in chemical plant control room design. The continuing evolution of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Process Safety Management (PSM)
regulations provided a background for illustrating the need for continued promulgation of new
regulations specific to the chemical industry. The chapter also includes an outline of the
origination, mission, and responsibilities of the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigative
Board (CSB). Specific issues relating to reporting regulations/structures and existing
quantitative incident measures were addressed and discussed in order to provide a
foundational relevance for agencies in place. Finally, this chapter contains documentation
outlining the impact display gauges have had on human error incidents in the chemical
industry.

Influence and Developments of Industrial Process Displays
Initial human factors research, with respect to instrumentation displays, focused on
determining whether or not differences did in fact exist between the responses to analog
displays versus digital displays for chemical plant operators. Extensive research in this area
with regard to military aviation, civil aviation, nuclear power plants, marine transportation,
and civilian ground transportation suggested that analog instrumentation displays enabled
operators to provide a consistent desired pattern of performance (Hanson, Payne, Shively,
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Kantowitz, 1981). Literature and incident reporting data did not reveal specific "chemical
plant" operations or control room design investigations of past incidents. Relationships
between the types of displays and resulting differences observed, i.e. process reaction times,
display style/type, or training with regard to overall process safety and chemical plant
operator training was not as abundant as aviation and military investigations. Similarities in
the literature did, however, provide a basis for this research.
Manufacturers of instruments, controls, and display gauges inundated the industrial
market with what they noted as “ Best Available Technology” . Many of these manufacturers
and companies provided extensive training for generic operations and problem solving
throughout the evolution of their respective product lines and had not historically taken into
consideration variables in human capabilities and process performance (Roth, Bennett,
Woods, 1987).
A paper presented in the Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 25th Annual
Meeting in 1981 by Hanson, Payne, Shively, and Kantowitz suggested that, overall, analog
display formats were “ far superior” to digital display formats within the confines of their
experiments. The stated purpose of this research was to establish what performance
differences, if any, existed between the basic display formats and to evaluate factors leading
to these differences.
The results of two separate but related experiments by Hanson, et al, (1981), suggested
that performance differences could be attributed to the operator’s capacity in handling
"transformational loads" imposed by the display format with reference to analog versus digital
displays.
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Hanson, et al. further noted that the results of these and other experiments indicated
preference of analog displays over digital displays from a design standpoint (See Figure A.01,
Appendix A). In both experiments it was observed that digital displays had a longer detection
time and were more sensitive to the number of displays that were monitored. Determining the
effects of increased detection times and resulting confusion (human error) in process
operations was not quantified in the noted experiments.

Regulatory Agencies
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970 was passed by Congress in
order to reduce or eliminate hazards in the American workplace. The mission of the act was
to “ Assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions” (29 CFR 1910, 1970). The act further provided for continuous standards
development, enforcement, and compliance assistance for the employer in order to maintain a
safe and healthful workplace. In February, 1992, OSHA published their final rule in the
Federal Register (29 CFR 1910.119) of developed standards on Process Safety Management
(PSM) of Highly Hazardous Chemicals (Federal Register, 1992). Standard 1910.119 provided
specific safety guidelines for manufacturing processes, storing, transportation, and human
exposure for a published list of highly hazardous chemicals. Chemical producers and users
were given 5 years to bring there processes and documentation up to PSM standards and to set
in place routine procedures for developing new designs, and engineered process
documentation as well as documented safety measures for the hazardous substances.
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The PSM Standard provided “ pro-active” sequences for making process changes,
implementing new processes, and outlined procedures for safety scenarios to be implemented
in those designs. Tools for these sequences included but were not limited to “ Fault Tree
Analysis” , “ What If” scenarios, “ Total Quality Management” , and a variety of other
mechanisms designed to review all possible events surrounding processes involving highly
hazardous chemicals (Federal Register, 1992).

United States Environmental Protection Agency
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 created the United States Chemical Safety
and Hazard Investigative Board (CSB) as an independent, scientific investigatory agency with
no regulatory or enforcement powers. The CSB structure was closely modeled after the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which routinely investigated transportation
accidents both in the industrial and civilian situations.
The mission of CSB board was to “ Investigate accidents in order to determine the
conditions and circumstances which lead up to the event and to identify the cause or causes so
that similar events might be prevented” (CSB, 2000).
As the board was created, it was designed to operate and function independently of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) but was required to collaborate with these and other agencies as
events required. With CSB as a noted exception, a majority of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendment articles and regulations were placed under the control of the EPA. During the
time that the CSB was created in 1990 it was not officially funded nor did it begin operations
until January 1998. Congress recognized that the board should have the unique ability to
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identify serious chemical hazards not otherwise addressed by the Department of Labor’s
OSHA or the EPA.
The CSB worked through multi-faceted, collaborative partnerships with stakeholders,
which included chemical companies, trade and professionals associations, insurance
companies, and local/federal/state environmental agencies. The CSB also acted in concert
with EPA and OSHA in data gathering and investigation reports to minimize duplication of
reports. The CSB developed a Memoranda of Understandings (MOUs) with OSHA and the
EPA as well as the NTSB. Finalization of a MOU with the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry augmented the CSB’s ability to consult on human health impact issues
(Poje, Rosenthal, Taylor, 2001).
The CSB used many of the tools of the OSHA PSM standard to facilitate
investigations of process failures and accidents. Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS), for
example, were a data tool that provided several federal agencies with basic non-proprietary
chemical substance information for review by company employees, material transportation
agencies, and first response agencies. All EPA first responder agencies were trained to use
MSDS sheets as well as other mandated emergency procedures that involved highly
hazardous chemicals.
Prior to the establishment of these agencies and the PSM Standard, there were 14
different agencies engaged in accident/incident prevention-related activities with no central
accident data collection or locus (Poje, Rosenthal, &Taylor, 2000).
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Data Collection
After the incident at Union Carbide’s methyl isocyanate (MIC) plant in Bophal, India
was closely followed by another release incident at Union Carbide’s sister plant in Institute,
West Virginia, public concern was very influential in promulgating a new law in section 112
(r) of the 1990 Clean Air Acts (CAA) Amendment. The thrust of this new rule was aimed at
preventing and minimizing consequences related to accidental chemical releases. The rule
encompassed both public and private facilities that manufacture, process, store, use, or
otherwise handle regulated substances or those substances specifically noted in OSHA’s
1910.119 PSM standard appendix “ A” , and further established procedures for specific
threshold quantities ranging from 500-2000 pounds (Kleindorfer, Feldman, & Lowe, 2000).
The rule also required regulated facilities to prepare and execute Risk Management
Programs (RMP) that provided hazard assessments, accidental release preventions, and
emergency response programs. To date, 15,000 facility reports have been received by the
EPA containing information regarding each facility’s accident history, accident prevention
program, and potential accident consequences.
The rule also specified that regulated facilities maintain a five-year history of
accidental releases and submit this history to the EPA (Belke, 2000). The release of this
information to the general public has been restricted to the agencies involved in data analysis
and to “ qualified researchers” . Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) were
provided data and information necessary for emergency planning on an as needed basis by the
local chemical facilities.
OSHA required injury and illness reporting on two separate forms. The OSHA No.
200, (now 300 Log) Log and Summary of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses and the OSHA
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No. 101 (now 301 Log) Supplementary Record Of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses both
provided information regarding illnesses and injuries sustained while the employee was at the
job site. Regulation 29 CFR 1904 mandated under what conditions incidents qualified to be
recorded in the No. 200 Log. All incidents recorded in the No. 200 Log must have a
completed No. 101 record to match them (OSHA, 2001). The old No. 200 log and the old No.
101 record were not investigative type recordkeeping tools, but contained enough information
to provide a basis for further investigation.
The CSB’s original role was to gather data collected from other agencies and entities
for the purpose of establishing baseline metrics for the general chemical industry. To this
end, the CSB compiled data from five existing federal data bases, and identified reported
chemical incidents that occurred within the United States over a ten-year period starting in
1987 and ended in 1996 in order to identify trends. This process is currently ongoing and the
intended outcome was to develop stakeholder’s consensus on key metrics, and to develop and
implement a publicly accessible system that could be used for prevention measures (United
States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 2002).
Additional sources of data were collected for industrial facilities involved in this
project. Safety audits and inspection of chemical processes from a maintenance and operation
perspective aided in developing event lines regarding the transformation from analog to
digital displays. Periodic safety and training reports facilitated the identification of areas of
data concentration. Incident reports at participating facilities provided direct evidence of
incident occurrences related to display types with regard to established event lines. These
incident reports were analyzed for content appropriateness relevant to the specific focus of the
research.
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Decision Making Processes and Safety
Prior Research
The concern for training in decision-making processes attracted considerable interest
in the last half of the 20th Century, mainly due to a number of spectacular incidents in
complex industrial systems. The more famous of these included the explosion at the
Flixborough plant (1974); the airplane collision at Tenerife (1977); the accident at the nuclear
power plant at Three Mile Island (1979); the explosion of the Challenger space shuttle (1986);
the meltdown at the nuclear power plant in Chernobyl (1986); and the multitude of problems
on the space station MIR (1998). The Bhopal Incident in Bhopal, India stood alone as the
hallmark to which the chemical industry regarded the beginning of the “ New Era” of safety
consciousness in chemical processes.
In the above-mentioned incidents, failures of human action and judgment had often
been cited as a contributive cause. In an increasing number of chemical accidents the main
cause or “ Root Cause” was attributed specifically to "human error". The estimated number
had grown from 30% in the 1960’s to as high as 70 to 90% at present (Hollnagel, E., 2001).
Hollnagel noted that there were a number of reasons for this trend, which included:
Technological systems have become more complex, hence more difficult to control;
Improved models/methods for "human error" analyses have made this cause more likely;
Technological systems have become more reliable, hence raising the relative number of other
causes; or “ It is sometimes cheaper and more convenient to put the blame on a human than to
redesign an entire system” (Hollnagel, E., 2001).
Wickens (1980,1984) proposed a "Multiple Resource Theory" (MRT) which provided
an investigative basis for determining the effects of display formatting on dynamic processes.
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This theory predicted that simultaneous tasks, which rely on the same data or display stimuli,
might show performance decrements as task difficulties increase.
Boles and Wickens further collaborated on the MRT design to assess decision task
performance changes in "dual-task" scenarios. The MRT was tested to predict issues
concerning display formatting. Expectations, with reference to the refined MRT, were that
superior performances should be obtained with a mixed display format. Results also
suggested a support of previous findings and indicated that the integration/non integration
task distinction was not an important variable to take into account when designing process
displays (Payne & Lang, 1995). Two factors accounted for this conclusion; 1. Tasks can be
practiced to a suitable degree of proficiency, and 2. Some tasks are difficult to characterize as
integration or non-integration. In addition, Payne and Lang noted that other than the
proximity compatibility principal (Barrett & Wickens, 1988; Carswell & Wickens, 1987)
there were few references to integration and non-integration tasks with respect to integrated
display and integrated controls.
Payne and Lang provided an approach to determine relative advantages and
disadvantages of "mixed” and "pure" display formats with reference to integration and nonintegration tasks. They defined mixed displays as concurrent analog and digital display
format presentations (Figure A.01, Appendix A). Pure display formats were either digital or
analog exclusively. Through the course of 4 experiments it was concluded that analog
displays provided shorter response latencies (Payne & Lang, 1995). It was found that it did
not take participants as long to respond to instrumentation presented in an analog format.
Additional research, however, demonstrated that analog superiority had been obtained
using a number of different and varied tasks such as discrete trials and continuous process
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monitoring with participants from various backgrounds including college students, and novice
and experienced airline pilots (Hanson, Payne, Shively, and Kantowitz, 1981).
Boles and Wickens (1987) noted that their study revealed large differences in the
overall speed of responses. The noted differences were specific to analog versus digital or
verbal (audio) displays in combination with the integration and non-integration tasks.
Response latency was the primary performance measure in those studies.
With reference to the response latencies, P.S.E. Farrell (1999) provided a study that
explored three perspectives in psychological phenomena processes and defined them as: (1)
the ideal transmission; (2) accuracy trade-off and interference effects; and (3) the sampling
strategy phase. It was anticipated that these combined phenomena would provide a potential
explanation for the “ Hysteresis Effect” (Response Lag) in information processing and
response. Response lag or the inability to make timely decisions and to respond properly to
real time situations became a major safety concern within the process design scenario.
Farrell concluded that short-term memory and the expectancy hypothesis do not
combine to fully explain the hysteresis effect in information processing. Notably the variation
in processing time for each individual rather than the amount of information processed and
responded to, suggested a more likely explanation for the hysteresis effect. Reaction time to
stimulus may vary with process demand and is manifested in a speed-accuracy trade off
mechanism (Kantowitz & Sorkin, 1983; Pew, 1969). It was also noted that reaction time
varied with spatial proximity of the information/data source (gauges, dials, enunciators)
(Wickens, 1992). Wickens also suggested that the “ time domain” might also be compromised
when two similar items (instruments or data stimuli) interfere with each other when sharing a
close temporal proximity, thus causing the reaction time to increase. This interference could
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be observed as either proactive or retroactive interference (Farrell, 1999). The focus of
Farrell's research was the human capabilities of air traffic controllers to process information in
a timely fashion.
Kantowitz (1981) theoretically reasoned that imposed additional transformational
loads caused the digital display inferiority in the operator responses. This hypothesized
transformational load in turn was thought to consume any spare operator processing capacity
for unexpected alarm conditions. Tullis (1980) suggested that differences similar to the ones
described in the previously noted experiments could be overcome by providing more frequent
training on digital displays.
Discussions and literature reviews noted with respect to this experiment included the
associated topic areas of "Attentional Processes", "Accidents, Safety, Human Error", and
"Displays and Controls". These listed topic areas along with references to previous research
were examined with respect to the stated research questions and provided a basis for further
study.

Training Approaches
Previous Human Factors Research
Rasmussen (1986) suggested that the internal anatomy combined with the processes of
the system being observed provided an interrelationship that does not exist when examining
or observing data or behaviors individually. The design of problem solving training for
optimum "Conscious Data Processing" must be based on a model that can be represented as
either internal or external for use in data processing. Rasmussen defined internal as "mental"
and external as visual objects such as drawings, dials, gauges, and or diagrams.
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The internal/external properties of a system process and the data representation
together provided a basis for the transformational load. System designers and engineers tend
to consider a "visual aid" form of process system depiction as optimal for predictable and
desired behavior rather than the internal model that would have naturally developed over time
with repeated operator use (Rasmussen, 1986).
Interacting successfully with a physical process system required that the state of the
system be known and understood. Included within this system state were the actions that had
to be identified for proper response and behavior for predicted future behavior (Rasmussen,
Pejtersen, and Goodstein, 1994). It was suggested that good design foundations for internal
process system models should be based on the proper training design relevant to the subject
process system.

Industrial Training
Murnaw, Roth, Vicente, and Burns (2000) noted that operator's "on the job"
experiences, abilities, and strategies for acquiring systems knowledge in general, augments
formal training to the point where there appears a seamless familiarity in observed behavior.
They further suggested that the training programs for nuclear power plants, for instance, were
more matters of regulation required certification rather than "on going" skills enrichment.
Another noted obstacle was that, in industry, since time was usually at a premium, "on the job
training" was the preferred management strategy for training most operators.
Training approaches differed in thoroughness and content throughout plant and the
industrial complexes. Rasmussen, Pejtersen, and Goodstine, (1994) suggested approaches to
training which would provide a perception of "Boundary Characteristics". Boundary
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characteristics established for specific training sessions and which were specific to
instrumentation displays would provide an implied spatial-temporal perception of the
involved process and its limits. With boundaries established and then communicated prior to
training exercises, participants were given opportunities for learning system characteristics
and more importantly process recovery techniques for emergency scenarios (Rasmussen,
Pejtersen, and Goodstine, 1994).
Process indicators (dials, gauges, charts, displays) in all instances provided an attempt
to communicate boundaries of the involved monitored process. It was hypothesized that a
formal familiarization process would enhance sensitivity to these boundaries through spatialtemporal perception/cognition and subsequent required sensorimotor control. In order for this
familiarization process to be successful, Rasmussen, et al, (1994) stated that the design
strategy must incorporate the creation of a truthful and ecologically correct work interface.
The correct work interface design for training was essential in removing obstacles that
tended to be present in developing skills and knowledge of adult learners. Shea (1994)
provided a listing of general factors that differentiated experienced adult learners from nonexperienced younger learners. Of major concern, and one of the factors noted by Shea, was a
low tolerance of the adult learner for training exercises and experimentation that appeared to
be remote from a usual task. This low tolerance coupled with other threatening factors such
as stress, insecurity, and reluctance (for various other reasons) to try or participate in new
processes provided challenges for designing training scenarios that addressed the task
problem area. Additional attributes considered for experimental design and training were
described by Shea as generational differences, cognitive styles, prior learning experiences,
and demographical differences.
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Dick and Cary (1996) defined two groups within an instructional process. The larger
group was the "Target Population" and within that group were the "Try-out Learners". The
Target Population was defined as the "abstract representation" of the largest range of learners
possible within the spectrum of the subject matter. The Try-out Learners were, on the other
hand, a convenience sample from within the Target Population. It was noted that wide
spectrums of skill and academic levels usually existed within the Target population. It was
for this reason that the compatibility and adaptability of the experimental/training site must
simulate, or at least be as familiar as a common workplace environment. With this
realization, consideration was given to the fact that the Try-out Learners were exposed to
scenarios that were, at best, global in nature and results weighted with the global variables in
mind (Rasmussen, et al, 1994). The design then, of a particular research, should provide
opportunities for all participants to be evaluated and more importantly, allow for all
participants to be exposed to skill enhancing and instructional processes. During training and
subsequent interventions processes a method of rigorous evaluation would have to be present
(Kazdin, 1982) in order to simulate workplace-training environments.
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CHAPTER III
Methodology
Statement of Problem
The problem of this research was to determine what impact the transition from analog
to digital process display gauges had on human error and safety in the chemical industry.

Research Hypotheses
Hypotheses.

It was hypothesized that the transition from analog to digital display gauges in
the chemical industry had no impact on the safety incidence rate at a .05
significance level.

Population
The chemical manufacturing companies involved in this study had a combined
chemical manufacturing experience of over 170 years. The plants were located in the MidOhio Valley and were considered to be representative of chemical manufacturing throughout
the country. All of the selected plants began manufacturing various chemicals in the MidOhio Valley within a 14-year period between 1941 to 1955. In all cases, the companies
whose plants were selected were well established in other locations throughout the United
States prior to placing facilities in this area.
Data gathered and examined, with written permission from each facility, included the
OSHA 200 logs and OSHA 101 summaries as well as engineering documentation regarding
installation of digital processes. Other documents reviewed were the facility's “ incident
reports” . The incident report is not a document that was required to be completed by OSHA
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regulations but was regarded in industry as an essential document for finding “ root causes”
and preventing incident reoccurrences. The identification of the root cause and further
investigation of incident reports was the narrower focus for determining which incidents were
to be categorized as “ human error” and related to misinterpretation of control room displays.
The engineering records that were required to be up to date and available under OSHA
Process Safety Management Guidelines served as a reference base. Additional data was
collected from government agencies as needed. These agencies included the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its satellite agencies, the United States
Department of Labor and satellite reporting agencies, and the independent chemical
manufacturers.

Procedures
Literature research and reviews of existing reported governmental data, selected
chemical manufacturers safety records, and engineering data relating to the phasing in of
digital process displays for those selected chemical manufacturers were conducted through the
following means:
Databases:
Individual plant records
Incident Investigations
OSHA Recordables
OSHA Standard Industry Classification (SIC) Codes for Recordable Incidents
United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board Reports (CSB)
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Unites States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Chemical Emergency
Preparedness and Prevention Office (CEPPO)
National Institute Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
Internet sites:
EPA
CSB
Center for Risk Management and Decision Processes
As presented in the previous chapters, the literature research revealed that 27% of the
reported 605,000 incidents involving chemical manufacturing processes over a ten-year
period were attributed to human error. These incidents involved lost workdays, injuries, and
fatalities which were recorded and reported to OSHA and which were, in turn, included in the
United States Department of Labor Occupational Illness and Injury database. All accidental
releases of chemicals reported to the United States Environmental Protection Agency were
included in the reporting database regardless of whether the releases resulted in an illness,
injury, or defined as a near miss. The preliminary review indicated that these databases could
be combined to provide a basis of comparison and study for individual chemical
manufacturers.
The 2 selected chemical manufacturers granted permission to the researcher to
examine safety records and manufacturing records. The records were examined with the
assistance of either the plant safety manager or his designee. Proprietary agreements between
the researcher and the selected chemical manufacturing plants were agreed to and signed in
order to protect the integrity of the processes and the confidential nature of the data.
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Preliminary conversations with the prospective participants and brief reviews of
engineering records provided evidence that the conversion to digital displays began in the
early 1980’s. This was followed by a transition period of about 6 years. Around the time
period of 1986 to 1987 several process operating units within the prospective facilities had
partially converted to the digital display format. During the next 7 years varying degrees of
digital display integration took place in these process units. The next 7-8 year period revealed
a transition back to analog-looking digital process controls. It was not possible to collect the
data that would have indicated the incidents prior to and during these different phases because
records prior to 1993 were eliminated. Each facility had a policy in place that allowed the
records older that 8 or 9 years to be purged.
The data that was available was, however, of the type and quantity that would lend
itself to analysis. Of the two facilities, Facilities Group "A" (Group A) exhibited a data range
from 1995 to 2001 and Facilities Group "B" (Group B) exhibited a data range from 1993 to
2001. The total period of time reviewed and examined did not exceed 20 years.
It had originally been proposed that the research be a "Before/After" format with a
designated transition period of time in which, supported by engineering records, a facility
would have converted to digital displays. This would have provided a historical (before/after
"linear") comparison between the two types of display formats. However in reviewing the
data at the subject facilities, it also became apparent that analog displays remained in use and
were relied upon as much as digital displays. Therefore the existing data presented and
opportunity for a "concurrent event" research format for comparison.
The frequency with which the data appeared as either analog or digital display
generated events provided an opportunity for analysis and comparison within the same facility
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at the same relative period of time. Further, the opportunity also presented itself to compare
two facility's data for the same relative period of time under similar conditions. Each facility
also exhibited detailed reports and records for all events examined. Using the above
conditions also provided an opportunity to compare the facilities incidence rates to national
incidence rates within similar Standard Industry Codes (SIC).
The incident/event data examined and included within this study were noted as
instrumentation and display-related and was arranged in one of the following categories:
1. Misinterpretation of display (operator confused the read-out or transposed
numbers indicated which resulted in an event)
2. Delayed response (operator noted the alarm of an indicated process change
and did not respond in a timely resulting in an event)
3. Implied as human operator error without specific clarification (report
indicated that there was a level of human error involved in causing the event
which was related to but specifically noted as display related)
4. Misunderstanding of process operations (operator observed the indications
correctly but did not respond appropriately resulting in an event)
Frequency rates for both governmental data bases and private industries records were
illustrated by multiplying the number of qualifying incidents by 200,000 (100 employees
working full time for 1 year) [On-line] (U.S. Department of Labor, 1997, p74) and dividing
that result by the total number of man-hours worked during the period of time examined. The
following is an example of the calculation:
Formula 1

(Total qualifying Incidents) X 200,000
Total Man-hours worked for the period examined
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=

Incidence Rate

Quantitative analysis of the criteria data provided a basis for determining whether an
impact, at the .05 significance level, existed when comparing analog and digital incidence
frequency rates to the total safety incidence rate in the chemical industry. The analysis also
provided a basis for determining the relationship between chemical industry incident
frequency rates and regulatory reporting data for the same period of time using the same
defined criteria. Finally, data was analyzed to determine if the transition from analog display
formats to digital display formats, at the .05 significance level, impacted the overall chemical
industry incident rates for the years examined.
The results and conclusions drawn from this analysis defined the nature of the impacts
that transitioning from analog to digital instrumentation display formats has had on the
chemical industry.

Analysis Format
In reviewing the data at the subject facilities, it became apparent that analog displays
remained in use and were relied upon as much as digital displays. Therefore the existing data
presented and opportunity for a "concurrent event" research format for comparison.

Summary
In summary, the number of participating facilities for the research was two. Neither
facility maintained or stored event records back beyond 1993. Each facility exhibited
concurrent analog and digital event data records.
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Demographically the two facilities maintained operations in the Mid-Ohio Valley and
were located approximately 28 miles apart. One facility was in a rural setting; the other was
in an urban setting with several other chemical plants in close proximity. There was a
difference of approximately 200 people employed between the two facilities. Each facility
drew employees from a different population base.
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CHAPTER IV
Analysis of Data
Introduction
The data for this research was gathered during visits to each participant’s plant site
using a data collection form (Figure B.01, Appendix B). The records that were available at
the visited sites were combined into “ Event” records rather than individual “ Safety Incidents”
or “ Environmental Incidents” . At one facility the records were cataloged in the Health,
Safety, and Environmental Department. In the other facility, the records were kept by the
Safety Department. Therefore, the recorded events included both safety and environmental
incidents, which may or may not have met conditions and requirements mandated by OSHA
or the EPA for being recorded or reported to the respective governmental agencies.

Analysis Structure
Determining the effects or impacts of converting from analog to digital display
formats on the total incident occurrences offered several analysis options. The data in this
chapter has been presented in the following manner to provide a progression indicating
individual characteristics of the following:
•

Combined Data for Group A and Group B (Table 1, page 44)

•

Individual Group Data for Group A and Group B (Table 2 & Table 3, pages 50 & 53)

•

Individual Group Incidence Data with Bureau of Labor Statistics Data as background
information (Table 4 & Table 5, pages 60 & 62)
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The record keeping arrangements examined were found to be similar for most
chemical plant sites as Safety and/or Environmental issues have the potential for causing
injuries and illnesses in both the local plant environment and surrounding areas. Data
collected and exhibited for this research included all events on record at each facility.

Analysis of Data
The research used two major indices (Analog or Digital related events) to examine the
possible or potential differences between analog and digital display related incidents. Within
these two indices, four “ Cause Code” sub-indices or categories were developed as described
in Chapter 3, page36. The sub-indices provided a focus on causes for the incidents being
reviewed. These sub-indices were “ Implied Human Error” , “ Misunderstood Process” ,
“ Misread the Display” , and “ Failure to Respond” . The “ Cause Code” data totals were listed
in Table 1.
Table 1 provides the tabulated data for the combined groups. The Incidence Rates
illustrated in the last two columns represent the analog, digital, and overall human error
calculations using Formula 1 as described in Chapter 3.
Table 1 contains the 346 reviewed events characterized as “ Human Error” . Of these
events, 64 were categorized as display related events and noted in the appropriate designated
cause code category.
The last three columns in Table 1 illustrate the “ Incidence Rate” for analog related
incidents, digital display related incidents, and the total human error incidents for the
combined facilities data. The incidence rate was defined as a function of the total events in
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each category multiplied by 100 man-years or 200,000 man-hours divided by the actual manhours for that particular year.
Table 1
Combined Group Data

Year

Combined Facilities Research Data
Display
Incidence
Total
Cause Code
Related
Rate
Rate
Incidents Man-hours Human Error
Events
ANA DIG
FR IH MP MD ANA DIG Human Error
Recorded

1995

4

4

3,220,046

48

2

1

3

2

0.248 0.248

2.981

1996

6

6

3,033,435

52

0

8

2

2

0.396 0.396

3.428

1997

5

5

2,782,973

59

1

6

3

0

0.359 0.359

4.240

1998

3

7

2,604,627

33

0

4

5

1

0.230 0.538

2.534

1999

4

5

2,508,703

54

3

2

2

2

0.319 0.399

4.305

2000

1

6

2,314,418

50

3

1

2

1

0.086 0.518

4.321

2001

5

3

2,247,800

50

1

4

1

2

0.445 0.267

4.449

TOTALS 28

36

18,712,002

346

10

26

18

10

Note: ANA = analog; Dig = Digital; FR = Failure to Respond; IH = Implied Human Error;
MP = Misunderstood the Process; MD = Misread the Display

A total of 2,073 events were reviewed from all group facilities. A total of 1812 events
were used for the purpose of testing the hypothesis. The remaining 261 events were counted
in the totals, but since these events were exhibited for year periods, 1993 to 1994, in only one
analysis group, they were not used in the final statistical analysis. This eliminated a potential
bias in the data. The data represented in the 1812 events denoted the same span, 1995 to
2001, of seven years with all groups.
The original intent of the research, as described in the Chapter III Addendum, was to
review and record applicable data and arrange it in a “ Before/After” matrix for the purpose of

41

illustrating analog events prior to a period of time over a span of years and then follow up
with a matrix of digital display events for approximately the same span of years. As the data
was gathered it became apparent that records of events available in the subject facilities did
not exist back beyond the year 1993.
During the data collection and analysis process it was determined that there were as
many analog instrument displays in use as there were digital. Access to process
instrumentation engineering records and major capital improvement project records indicated
a two-fold trend. One trend illustrated that some new digital display equipment purchased for
control rooms and process control centers functioned as analog instrument displays. The
control logic and operation was digital, but the display looked like and functioned as an
analog display. Some were very good representations of analog displays and some were more
“ cartoon like.” A second trend noted was that a standardization process was being
implemented with each newly engineered control display project. This standardization
continued to allow engineers to “ hide” non-critical process data from the operators view and
provided a means for the data to be recorded and printed to a hard copy. The standardized
displays provided a “ Real Time” assessment of the critical processes in progress without all of
the otherwise distracting background data being displayed concurrently during the process.
Color codes were noted on displays where the entire analog-looking display would change
color and provided an extra measure of recognition for the operators. This standardization of
colors is designed to help operators in the decision making process during upset conditions.
In reviewing the event reports it became necessary to establish parameters for
categorizing events. The structure of the existing event report form at the facilities
accommodated this necessity by exhibiting a category for “ Human Error.” The event records
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were reviewed in their entirety twice to ensure that no human error events were overlooked.
The human error events were isolated and reviewed again to assure that the event qualified for
a display related incident. In most cases the report narrative described in great detail actions
and circumstances that surrounded the events. From the year 1998 to present, the reports
became more detailed as efforts at the facilities increased to determine the “ root cause” of the
incidents. These two report characteristics expedited gathering and categorizing the data that
is used in the final analysis. Several reports in each of the groups required further
investigation to clarify qualification status for the research. These tasks included questioning
the operators, actual visual inspection of the unit in operation and a further review of
engineering records.
Data and observations indicated that, in general, analog displays tended to be near or
on the equipment being operated, and the digital displays tended to be more abundant in
control rooms or on remote panels. However, there were exceptions to these observations.
Data illustrated in Figure 1 indicate an overall declining “ man-hours worked” trend of
30% during the observed span of time. This occurs when there has been a reduction in force
or premium time (over-time) has been reduced. Therefore, since the Analog and Digital
Incidence Rates remained relatively the same (or within .4321 (Incidence Rate) points),
incidents per capita increased. The Total Human Error Incidence Rate also indicated an
overall trend increase, except for the year 1998, further supporting the proposal that there was
an increase in the per capita human error type events within the specific research groups.
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Note: The identified Analog /Digital Incidence Rates were the same in 1995, 1996, and 1997.
Figure 1. Combined Incidence Rates Relationship to Total Man-hours/Total Human Errors

Figure 2 indicates the actual combined incidents and their associated trend
relationships. Two of the four categories; “ Implied Human Error (IH)” and “ Misunderstood
the Process (MP), trended downward during the research period. In the two remaining
categories; “ Failure to Respond (FR)” trended up and “ Misread Display (MD)” remained
level. The trend lines in Figure 2 indicated a condition that was not influenced by the number
of man-hours worked during the period. Therefore, the cause codes represented indicated
that, without considering any other influences on the data, there was an identifiable or focused
area where there was an opportunity for intervention.
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Note: Trend lines for each data group are illustrated as dashed. FR =Failure to Respond;
IH = Implied Human Error; MP = Misunderstood the Process; MD = Misread Display.
Figure 2. Combined Incidents by Cause Codes

Figure 3 displays the combined analog and digital event data with the man-hours
worked. The combined cause code events for both analog and digital display events trended
down as well as the Total Man-hours Worked. The Total Human Error events category
exhibited a stationary or flat trend line. During the research period the combined facilities
“ Man-hours worked” declined from 3,220,046 in 1995 to 2,247,800 in 2001. This
representation indicated that there was 1 Human Error Event for every 67,084 man-hours
worked in 1995 and 1 Human Error Event for every 44,956 man-hours worked in 2001. This
data set supported the proposal that the per capita human error events were increasing.
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Note: ANA = Analog; DIG = digital; MM = 100,000

Figure 3. Combined Analog and Digital Incidents related to Total Human Error Events and
Man-Hours.

Table 2 illustrates the raw data for Group “ A.” For reference, this table of data
includes the “ OSHA Recordable” incident events that occurred during research period. The
“ OSHA Recordable” incidents category indicated the number of events that were serious
enough to qualify for recording or reporting in the OSHA 200 Log. These recordable
incidents represent a range comparison of, from 25% to 45% of, the number of Human Error
events. The “ OSHA Recodables” were not used in the final analysis because the event
records included both OSHA Recordable events and EPA Reporting events. Documentation
was not consistently available for the EPA reported events. The event reports did indicate the
area of impact for each event for categorization purposes.
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Table 2 data also displays the tabulated data for Analog events, Digital events, Manhours, and Human Error (HE) events that occurred during the study period. The Analog and
Digital events combined in Group A for each individual year amount to less that 25% of the
Human Error events. The Man-hours category in the Group A data indicated a sharp decline
while the event categories remained stable for the period of study.

Table 2.
Group “ A” Data
Group A
Analog

Digital

Man-hours x 1,000,000

Recordable

HE Events

1995

3

2

2.3130

17

37

1996

4

4

2.1964

12

32

1997

2

3

1.9410

9

46

1998

3

4

1.7946

6

19

1999

2

3

1.6917

11

26

2000

1

3

1.4834

10

33

2001

3

2

1.4568

10
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Figure 4 provides a graphic illustration of the relationship of Group A's individual
OSHA Recordable events to the Human Error events. Trend lines indicated a slight decline in
Group A’s total recorable events as well as a decline in the Human Error events for the entire
period of study. The declines in both categories indicated a relationship and a trend that on
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the surface appeared to be desirable. However, at this point in the analysis, the data in both

Incidents

categories were not linked to provide a true indication of the relationship.
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Figure 4. Group "A" OSHA Recordable Events Comparison with Total Human Error Events

Figure 5 illustrates the relationship of the Analog and Digital incident data in Group A
to the man-hours worked during the study period. The data indicated that the number of
analog and digital events declined during the research period. Figure 5 further indicated a
decline in Man-hours over the study period that ranged from 2.3130 million man-hours in
1995 to 1.4568 million man-hours in 2001; a .85562 million man-hour decrease. Figure 5
also displays what appeared to be desirable trending, however the data is not factored properly
to display the true incidence relationship.
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Figure 5. Group "A" Analog/Digital Incident Comparison to Man-hours Worked

Table 3 illustrates the raw data recorded for Group "B" during the study period. This
table includes the "OSHA Recordable" (Recordable) incident events that occurred during the
research period for comparison and reference purposes. The "OSHA Recordable" incidents
category presented in this chart indicate the number of events that occurred which were
serious enough to qualify for recording or reporting in the OSHA 200 Log. These recordable
incidents numbers indicate a comparative range from 42% to 71% of the number of Human
Error events recorded.

This comparison range was noted as 2 times the same comparable

range of Group A. As in Group "A", the "OSHA Recordables" were not used in the final
analysis because the event records included both OSHA recordable events and EPA Reporting
events.
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Table 3 displays the tabulated data for Analog events, Digital events, Man-hour
worked, and Human Error (HE) events. The combined Analog and Digital events for each
year in Group B represent a range of 14% to 38% of the Human Error events.

Table 3
Group “ B” Data
Group B
Analog

Digital

Man-hours x 100,000

Recordable

HE Events

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

1
2
3
0
2
0

2
2
2
3
2
3

0.9070
0.8370
0.8420
0.8100
0.8170
0.8310

6
12
9
10
12
11

11
20
13
14
28
17

2001

2

1

0.7910

5

9

Figure 6 illustrates the relationship of the Human Error events to the total OSHA
Recorded events in Group B. Trend lines indicated that there was a slight decline in the
Group B’s total recorable events and an incline in the trend line for Human Error events.
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Note: Trend lines for each data group are illustrated as dashed. HE = Human Error Events.
Figure 6. Group "B" OSHA Recordable Incidents Compared to Total Human Error Events.

Figure 7 illustrates the relationship of the Analog and Digital event data in Group B to
the man-hours over the study period within the same group. The trend at this scale indicated
the number of analog and digital events during the research period declined slightly. Figure 7
also illustrates a slight decline of Man-hours over the study period for Group B from .9070
million man-hours in 1995 to .7910 million man-hours in 2001; a .1160 million man-hour
decrease. The data presented for Figure 7 illustrated a graphic contrast between Analog and
Digital incidents in the years 1998 and 2000.
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Figure 7. Group "B" Analog/Digital Incident Comparison to Man-hours Worked

Figure 8 provides a comparison of Analog and Digital incidents to the total recorded
incidents reviewed for Group A. A trend line was provided on this figure to illustrate a
decline in the total recorded events during this research period. It should be noted that Group
A was the group that exhibited the greatest decrease in man-hours over the research period.
This suggested that the total declining recorded events and the total man-hours for the same
research period may have influenced each other. However, as these two categories indicated
declining trends, analog and digital incidents remained relatively the same.
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Figure 8. Group "A" Analog/Digital Incidents versus Total Incidents Reviewed

In contrast to Figure 8, Figure 9 illustrates a trend line that was inclining for the total
recorded events in Group B. The exhibited decline in man-hours for Group B (Figure 7), as
previously noted, indicated that even though the man-hours were declining, the total recorded
events were increasing, while the number of analog and digital events remained relatively the
same.
This indicates two things; 1 Group B was experiencing a higher per capita incident to
man-hour relationship, and 2 even though the analog and digital event numbers remained
steady the ratio of analog and digital to man-hour events was also increasing.
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Figure 9. Group "B" Analog/Digital Incidents versus Total Incidents Reviewed

Figure 10 illustrates the analog and digital incidence rates compared to the total manhours for the duration of the research period for Group A. A trend line was not provided for
the total man-hour graphic because the indication was self-explanatory. However, trend lines
for the analog and digital incidence rates were provided to illustrate that each of these
categories suggested a positive or upward trend. It should be noted that, in Figure 8 the
analog and digital incident events did not indicate a very large positive or negative trend,
although the analog incidents events did suggest a slight decline. As discussed earlier in the
narrative related to Figures 4 and 5, the incident trends appeared to be indicating a good trend,
but were not properly factored with reference to the man-hours worked.
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The analog and digital “ incidence rate” (a factor of the number of incidents and the
man-hours worked) in both cases suggested an incline or increase over the research period.
Since the incidence rate in Figure 10 was a function of the total man-hours, any change in
either category directly affected the other associated indicators. Figure 10 provides a
graphical representation indicating that both the Analog and Digital incidence rates were
trending up.
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Note: A.I.R. = Analog Incidence Rate, D.I.R. = Digital Incidence Rate
Figure 10. Group "A" Analog/Digital Incidence Rate/Man-hour Comparison.

Figure 11 illustrates the analog and digital incidence rates as compared to the total
man-hours for the duration of the research period for Group B. A trend line was not provided
for the total man-hour graphic because the indication was self-explanatory. However, trend
lines for the analog and digital incidence rates were provided to illustrate that each of these
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categories suggested a downward and level trend respectively. It should be noted that, in
Figure 9 the analog and digital incident events did not indicate a very large positive or
negative trend although the analog incidents events did suggest a slight decline. The analog
and digital incidence rates in both cases in Figure 11 suggest a decrease and leveling
respectively over the research period. The incidence rate in Figure 11 is a function of the total
man-hours; therefore any change in either category directly affected the other associated
indicators.
The data in Figure 11 indicated that the per capita incidence rate for Analog related
incidents trended down or decreased while the Digital per capita incidence rate remained
level.
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Figure 11. Group "B" Analog/Digital Incidence Rate/Man-hour Comparison
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2001

Events Summary

Table 4 illustrates "Incidence" data for Group A. The four columns represent event
data that was calculated using the man-hours worked for the years indicated. Data used from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in column 1 was complete up to and including the year
2000. No data was available for the year 2001.

Table 4
Group “ A” Incidence Data
BLS Rate
1995
4.9
1996
4.3
1997
3.9
1998
3.4
1999
4.3
2000
3.5
2001
nd
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2000)

Group Rate

Analog

Digital

1.47
1.09
0.93
0.67
1.30
1.35
1.37

0.025
0.36
0.2
0.33
0.23
0.13
0.41

0.17
0.45
0.3
0.44
0.35
0.4
0.27

The data in Figure 12 indicated that, for Groups A's Standard Industry Code (SIC
Code), the industry’s safety incidents as a whole were declining. The inference was that, over
the period of the study, more OSHA Recorcable events occurred per man-hours worked.
Another way to interpret this data was that, even if the raw incident numbers for either/both
the Analog or Digital Display events remained the same, the incidence rate would increase as
long as the man-hours continued to decrease.
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Data did not exist in the BLS database regarding display-related events nor did it exist
for human error events in general. However, based on the data presented in Table 5, within a
range of 0% to 16% of all OSHA recordable events, there would be 1 display related event for
this SIC code industry category.
The large graphical gap between the BLS incidence rate line and Group A’s incidence
rate indicated that Group A, from an industry comparison standpoint, had experienced less
than half of the normal industry recordable incidences. They had a better safety record
overall than others within their respective industry classification.
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Figure 12. Summary Comparison of Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Data and Group “ A”
Data.

Table 5 illustrates "Incidence" data for Group B. The four columns represent event
data that was calculated using the man-hours worked for the years indicated. Data used from
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the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in column 1 was complete up to and including the year
2000. No data was available for the year 2001.
The data for Table 5 and Figure 13 provided an illustration of a summary comparison
of data for Group B with regard to Group B's Standard Industry Classification Code (SIC).
Table 5 indicates that Group B's OSHA Recordable incidence rates were at or below the BLS
Incidence rate for Group B’s SIC Code. Figure 13 below provides a graphical representation
indicating the close proximity of the Incidence Rates.

Table 5
Group B Incidence Data
BLS Rate

Group Rate

Analog

Digital

1995

3.3

1.32

0.22

0.44

1996

2.9

2.87

0.46

0.46

1997

4.3

2.14

0.71

0.47

1998

2.5

2.47

0

0.74

1999

2.9

2.94

0.48

0.48

2000

2.7

2.65

0

0.72

1.26

0.5

0.25

2001
nd
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2000)

Figure 13 illustrates that, for Groups B's SIC Code, the industry as a whole was
declining, in a manner similar to the Group Rate category in Figure 13. This was interpreted
as fewer OSHA Recorcable events per man-hour worked. Figure 13 also indicates that the
incidence rate for OSHA Recordables for Group B was trending up very slightly, since there
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were more incidences per man-hour worked. Data did not exist in the BLS database
regarding display-related events, nor for human error events in general. Based on the data
presented in Table 5, it was found that within a range of 0% to 16% of all OSHA recordable
events, there was 1 display related event for this SIC code industry category.
The relatively small gap represented in Figure 13 between the BLS incidence rate for
Group B’s SIC Code and Group B’s incidence trend, indicated that Group B’s incidence
performance over the study period was at, or just below the BLS rate for SIC code industry
category.
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Figure 13. Summary Comparison of Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Data and Group “ B “
Data.
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CHAPTER V
Summary, Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Problem Statement
The problem of this research was to determine the impact the transition from analog to
digital process display gauges had on the safety incidence rate relating to human error
frequency in the chemical industry.

Summary
The belief that analog display gauges in the chemical industry were being replaced by
digital display gauges because they were faster than analog displays, more accurate, and
provided a safer operational environment provided the direction and purpose for this research.
The collection and examination of the data for this research yielded several fundamental
findings and conclusions regarding human error as related to analog and digital display
gauges within the chemical industry.

Statistical Observations
The final analysis of the presented data did not establish the validity for the null
hypothesis with regard to the Digital Incidence Rates and the Combined Incidence Rates. The
Null Hypothesis stated that: The transition from analog to digital display gauges, in the
chemical industry, had no impact on the safety incidence rate at a .05 significance level, was
however validated for the Analog Incidence Rate.
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A one-way ANOVA (See Tables 6 and 7) was conducted on the individual groups;
Group A and Group B. No significant difference was found (F (1,12) = 0.726>.05) for the
Analog Incidence Rate. However significant differences were found [(F (1,12) =
5.063 <. 05), (F (1,12) = 8.380 < .05)] for the Digital Incidence Rate and the Combined
Display Incidence Rates respectively.
In Tables 6 and 7, the “ F values” indicated that the null hypothesis was verified for the
Analog Display Incidence Rate, or that there was no significance at the .05 level. The “ F
Value” for the Digital Display Incidence Rate and the Combined Display Incidence Rate,
however, was significantly greater than 1, indicating that there was more variation between
groups than within groups. This condition indicated that the null hypothesis was not valid and
that the Digital Incident Rates as well as the Combined Display Incidence Rates had a
significant affect on the overall safety incident rate.

Table 6
Analysis of Variance for Analog Incidence Rates and Combined Display Incidence Rate

Analog Incidence
Rate

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

Between Groups

0.033

1

0.033516071

0.726

0.410

Within Groups

0.553

12

0.046125595

0.587

13

.215

1

.215

8.380

.013

.308

12

0.02569

.524

13

Total
Combined Display Between Groups
Within Groups
Rate
Total
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Table 7
Analysis of Variance for Digital Incidence Rates and Combined Display Incidence Rate
Sum of Squares
Digital Incidence
Rate

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

5.063

0.043

8.380

.013

Between Groups

0.099457143

1

0.099457143

Within Groups

0.235685714

12

0.019640476

0.335142857

13

.215

1

.215

.308

12

0.02569

.524

13

Total
Between Groups
Combined Display
Rate
Within Groups
Total

Data Review
The data gathered for this research provided an opportunity to compare and contrast
the subject group’s recordkeepng procedures and evaluate the nature of their occurrences. The
numerical range of recorded events for both groups reviewed was from 190 per year at the
upper limit to 80 per year at the lower limit. The “ Display Event” data represented a
relatively small but significant portion of the total safety/environmental incidents records.
During the data collection efforts it was discovered that incident remediation processes
were initiated after the events had occurred. This included, but was not limited to,
documented follow-up training and/or instruction in almost every case. The instruction and
training comments in the follow-up reports suggested that there was a well-established
retroactive program to address problems as they occurred.
Table 1 listed data most relevant to this research. The key data categories displayed in
Table 1 for the combined group results in the research years examined included the following:
•

The years the research data represents.
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•

Display related Incidents for both Analog and Digital displays.

•

Man-hours worked for the years represented.

•

The total “ Human Error” type events/incidents that the records indicated.

•

Cause Codes for the years represented.

•

Incidence rates for Analog and Digital Incidents as well as Human Error events.

Analog and Digital Displays
The incident reports from the group facilities did not have specific form categories for
display related events. The reports did however provide a check box or an area category in
the form for the explanation for any event that was regarded as a “ Human Error” . Detailed
examination of each of these human error indicated events provided information that allowed
for a determination of the type, if any, of display involved in the event. The narrative section
of the reports provided further insight into determining the cause code category. The report
narrative in combination with data from engineering records, process area visits, and some
follow-up questions for clarification provided background information for categorizing the
events. As previously noted the analog display instruments tended to be located in the
immediate vicinity of the equipment that was being monitored and the digital display
instruments tended to be located in a control area or a location removed from the process
equipment being monitored.
During the process of clarifying histories and engineering approaches to display
installations, engineers at the Group A facility stated that there had been an effort to
standardize the display panel color codes and operational display color sequences. This
standardization would provide a basis for standardized training for all production operators
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and permit operators the flexibility to go from one operating unit to another with minimal
impact in the interpretation of displays.

Man-hours
The years represented in the research data were years that had complete records for
each month of that particular year. Group B’s records were complete for two additional years
(1993 and 1994) but these years were not included in the analysis because Group A’s records
were not complete during the same period. The man-hours for the combined groups dropped
by approximately 1 million hours over the entire study period. Each group indicated a trend
that was consistent with all major manufacturing industries for the past 15 years (BLS, 2000).
This drop reflected an industry-wide trend that has plateaued as of the end of 2001. Several
factors including the general economic downturn, automation of processes, and the general
shifting of product manufacturing bases (foreign production of same or similar products)
contributed to the man-hour decline.
Group A’s raw man-hour rate was twice the man-hour rate of Group B for the study
period. The tabulated man-hour rate included the hours worked for all personnel that worked
at the facility during the year represented. Work hours for construction activities at the plants
were not included in the totals.
Group A reported man-hours to the nearest hour and Group B reported man-hours to
the nearest 1,000 hours. Both groups gathered worked hours from payroll records and used
their individual rounding methods to prepare reports required OSHA.
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Total Events on Record
The combined total events (not shown in Figure 1) on record suggested that diligence
existed for the recording and “ follow-up” of any event that appeared to be out of the ordinary
from a process, environmental, or safety standpoint. There existed a level of cooperation and
communication between production personnel, environmental personnel, and the safety
personnel functions at each of these facilities that was essential in this data recording effort.
The records examined at these facilities exhibited a range of events from minor cut/bruises
and other non-events, such as behavioral problems with no resulting injury or process upset,
to very serious conditions such as those requiring emergency transport or evacuation. This
attention to detail further verified the level of effort present for addressing and preventing
incidents observed in the facility reports
The combined data revealed a recorded total of 1812 entries in the incident records. Of
these 1812 events, 346 were designated as Human Error incident events for the research
period. Of the 346 human error events, 64 events on record were categorized as either analog
or digital display related. The 64 recorded events and incidents represented 3.5% of all
recorded events over the study period.

Total Human Error Events
The incident reports provided sufficient detail to designate and specify categories for
Human Error events. This specific information, included on the report forms, along with the
narrative provided insights into the event types. The information further aided in the narrative
review of other events to determine if they too may have qualified for the display related
categorization under the format of this study. Several cases were discovered and categorized
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as display related events that were not originally marked as “ Human Error” on the incident
report form.
During the incident report investigation it became apparent that several Human Error
designated events shared similarities with other reviewed events. These cases appeared to
share a commonality for both type and process location throughout the study period years.
The “ common” or similar events in some cases were exact repeats of previous events in the
same operating area. To assure thoroughness, events that appeared to be similar or repeated
were further investigated in order to verify that records had not been misfiled or recorded
again.
Root causes for the events that shared common characteristics fell into two categories.
The first category of common events was where the operators involved in the incident were
assigned to the production area on a temporary basis and did not have a familiarity with the
processes involved. The second general category of root causes focused on a change in
processes within an operating unit. These changes included the installation of new
equipment, different specifications (recipes) to an existing process, start-up after a long
maintenance shutdown, and operators returning from a long break.

Trends
Figure 1 provided a visual reference to the combined incidence rates. Trend lines in
Figure 1 clearly depict an upward trend in the number of Human Error Events and Man-hour
rate declines over the same period of time. The analog and digital events were included in the
Human Error events category. When set apart from the Human Error events, the combined
analog and digital incidence rate remained on a relatively even level.
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Figure 2 provided a combined display incident graphic where the incidents were
separated into the individual Cause Codes. The incidents in Figure 2 were charted as the
actual count of incident events. Two of the four categories indicated a downward trend and
two indicated an upward trend. Notably, Figure 2 depicted a trend rise in the cause code
labeled “ FR” or Failure to Respond. The Cause Code, Failure to Respond, was generally
described in the event narratives as (paraphrased) “ … operator took too long to respond … ”
or “ … operator was waiting for something else to happen in conjunction with … ” .
The associated “ FR” trend line in Figure 2 suggested a validation of P.S.E. Farrell’s
(1999) “ Response Lag” hypothesis for the potential explanation of what would happen in a
“ sampling strategy phase” of the decision making process. The trend indicated that the
operators were waiting, analyzing, comparing, and or procrastinating as to the next course of
action while observing an instrument indication, and in the course of doing so forfeited the
opportunity to provide the proper response. Again this was further verified in the associated
report narratives.
It was found that the category “ IH” in Figure 2 or Implied Human Error trended down
over the same period. This particular down trend indicated that, the report originator or
incident investigator, rather than select a “ Catch All” category, such as Implied Human Error,
became better at assigning more germane causes to incidents. The Figure 2 trend further
indicated a departure from Hollnagel’s (2001) hypothesis in which he suggested that it had
become cheaper to or more convenient to put the blame on human error.
Figure 3 actual count data indicated that as a combined group all human error related
events were declining. The man-hours data also exhibited a downward trend. The
presentation of the actual count data in this charted form was not factored with the man-hours
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for clarity. The clarity in this graphic provided a focus on specific events for specific
associated dates that were otherwise skewed in the combined incidence figures. The data in
Figure 3 provided a visual relationship for combined analog and digital display incidents and
the human error event trend.
Individual group trends were represented in Figures 4 through 13 in order to provide
“ within group” comparisons to Bureau of Labor Statistics data and incidents factored by manhours to generate incidence rates for individual variables.

Findings and Conclusions
The conclusion that was drawn from the findings of collected data summarized above
was that the transition from analog to digital displays made a significant negative impact in
the safety incidence rates in the chemical industry at the .05 level. The negative impact was
that digital display related events were a significant causal factor in the increase of the total
human error events. The total combined display related events were also a significant causal
factor in the increase of then overall safety incident rate.
The research groups were considered to be typical within the chemical industry. The
Standard Industry Code (SIC) incidence rates associated with the study groups suggested that
the study groups fell within a range that was average to below average (better than) of the
normal level when compared to the chemical industry, within the same manufacturing SIC
designation.
The relationship of display related incidents was then theoretically protracted to the
other manufactures within the SIC code and to the chemical industry in general. This would
generally imply that 3.5% of all incidents were display related. It was further concluded from
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this research that within the 3.5% of display related events there was a significant number of
digital display related events that contributed to the total incidence rate.
Initially the 3.5% of total incidents did not appear to be a worrisome percentage and
indeed appeared to be completely overlooked or ignored as a significant contributor. It should
be noted however, that when an event in a chemical plant does occur the effects could be
disastrous. Tewksbury, Bhopal, Institute, and Three Mile Island (Nuclear Power Plant) are a
few examples of notable occurrences in which human error with regard to display
misinterpretation have been suggested at some level of operation as a contributing factor.
Implications with regard to the various trend lines clearly established that demands on
the process operators were increasing, and the emphasis to complete more tasks in smaller
allotted time was evident. To exacerbate and possibly amplify potential problem effects, the
frequency of the training program was reported as not being consistent. Comments by plant
personnel were repeated in both groups to the effect of that they knew they needed to do a
better job with training.
A secondary conclusion (and possibly the most important) was that more tasks were
being assigned to fewer operators. Although the display related incident rate was the focus of
this research, the increase in the number of required tasks provided a catalyst for incident
causes in other categories such as slips and falls, hand cuts, and improper lifting and carrying.
Although environmental conditions clearly contributed to these kinds of incidences, human
error or behavior was often overlooked as the root cause.
The incident reports in the documented research occasionally provided narratives in
the follow-up portion of the report describing proper task steps for the normal operation of the
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involved processes. The reports implied but did not cite operator behavior as a contributor
due to the number of process tasks being performed.
The final analysis suggests that relevant and consistent operator training programs
could reduce and in some cases eliminate the frequency of human error display related events.

Concluding Comments/Observations
To enhance program development, designers and engineers should consider all
available resources when considering specific systems for automation. A major resource is
the incident reports themselves. As narratives in the reports and overall investigations
become more thorough they could provide a valuable insight into the operational conditions
and behaviors of the operators in both normal and upset operating conditions.
Another valuable resource to be integrated into the initial developmental process is the
vendors or suppliers of the automated technology and equipment. Quality in this selection
cannot be overlooked. The vendors will typically sell anything that seems to fit the process
without a great deal of process knowledge. They will also provide a cursory training program
specific to the instrument or technology that they are selling. Often for proprietary reasons
vendors and systems designers do not know the intricacies of the involved processes and do
not know the operator skill level. This situation will handicap the training from the “ well
meaning” vendor’s standpoint.
This brings up a third and most important consideration for system design with
reference to operator functions. This is the training consideration. As previously noted,
incident reports are an excellent resource for designing the training scenarios for individual
processes. In considering training it will be important to review past process histories from
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production and safety points of view. Training scenarios and exercises should be designed to
duplicate the process and the operator environment as closely as possible.
A final suggestion would be to standardize operational processes related to displays as
much as possible. In discussions with personnel this was recognized and being implemented
to some extent. The standardization of instrumentation display and training would be
recommended priorities.
This research did not visit the proactive training aspect of the incident remediation
within the group’s facilities. During the investigations statements from various personnel
provided insight into the training programs and indicated that there was a current inadequacy
in this area, or at least opportunities for improving training modules across the training
spectrum.
Training Assessment Methods
Training assessments at regular intervals could provide a “ snapshot” look at current
operating conditions. Assessments are the only opportunity for management to cite positive
performances in process tasks. These assessments could also expose gaps (discrepancies or
deficiencies) in task performance related to either display conditions (analog or digital) or
behaviors related to the operations tasks. The discovered gaps could then be categorized as
either deficiencies or discrepancies in operator task performance. Deficiencies require further
investigation and usually more detailed training and performance assessment. Discrepancies
usually only require “ refresher” type training or task reviews.
It is recognized that training resources and time allotments are not always convenient
in an operating atmosphere and therefore segmented modules may provide the most effective
approach. For the preceding reasons it was recommended that those persons who work as
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temporary or “ fill-in” operators be trained more frequently in all cross-functional operator
capacities. As new process automation is introduced into the operational environment, all
affected operators should be frequently trained.

Recommendations for Further Research
To achieve a deeper understanding of the effects safety incidents with regard to
display instrumentation technologies, a broader communication level needs to be established
between the various levels and functions of industry. Within these communications levels,
behavioral patterns and process operational functions also need to be assessed from the
chemical industry and equipment manufacture perspective so that guidelines and boundaries
can be established. Control of processes is the control of boundaries.
In perusing further research in the field of safety incident causes and more particularly
where safety records are to be examined, it must be understood by the researcher that there is
and will be a natural reluctance to make these types of records available to outside sources.
Manufacturers regard these records as “ Recorded Failures” within their programs and
therefore are not proud of the documentation. The stigma and the underlying implied liability
associated publishing safety incident records in a detailed format are formidable and will be a
barrier to the researcher. The Bureau of Labor Statistics does, however, publish incident rates
in general categories as well as fatality reports that list the company, location, and number of
fatalities associated with the incident and brief description.
As found with this research, the group subjects records become more complete within
a time frame of the last 8 to 14 years. Records previous to 1985 are not available at the level
of detail that would allow for complete examination and analysis.

73

Specific recommendations for further research include:
1.

The examination of behavioral patterns and frequencies within the chemical

industry’s control room operators as they relate to patterns affecting the decision
making process that may have an impact on safety incident rate.
2.

The investigation of industrial events from previous incident records for

industries associated with the chemical industry such as pharmaceutical, agricultural,
and petroleum to determine transitional impacts of control automation and display
indicators to the safety incidence rate.
3.

The experimentation, documentation, and analysis of mix display formats for

control room operators in the chemical industry. The suggested methodology for this
proposed study would be a direct observation or an insitu arrangement Single Case
ABAB design due to ethical considerations.
4.

A final suggested research would be that of investigating the extent or to what

level current instrumentation manufacturers and suppliers assess their product viability
prior to making it available to industry.
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Appendix A
Analog/Digital Display Gauge Layout
Figure A.01 illustrates differences in analog and digital gauges. The analog gauges at
the top represent a temperature gauge and a common compass respectively. The small digital
display gauges represent digital displays. Both types of gauges are providing the same
information for the type represented. Analog display gauges provide a spacial reference to
data before and after the indicated data. The digital displays provide only the indicated data
with no reference to the range above and below the current indication.

Figure A.01. Gauge Examples
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Appendix B

Data Gathering
The Data collection form provided a condensed reference to events recorded in the
event reports at the subject facilities. The form was designed so that additional yeas could be
added and specific event dates could easily be linked to the specific entries found in the
facility data logs. The sequential event reference number in “ Column 2” was the same
sequence number assigned in the subject facility’s log. This entry allowed quick reference to
specific events during questions sessions where event clarification was necessary.
The event cause and follow-up training entries provided a snapshot of the level of
detail and rememdiation that existed within the facility. This set of data also aided in
categorizing the potential impact of the event or seriousness of the event by noting training
types such as “ Reviewed production sequences, Safety refresher, Hazardous material release
talk, etc.
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Incident

Event

Display

Record

Cause

Type

Date

Group (Identification)
Training

H.E.

Type

Man-hours

ANA DIG

EVENTS

Cause Code

FR

IH

MP MD

9

10

11 12

Incident

Incidence

Type

Rate
ANA DIG

YEAR

Number

Total

YEAR

Totals

YEAR

Totals

Totals
Column
1

Column 2

3

4

5

Column 6

Root Cause of the event

Manhour

Example: Human Error

Total for

Fail to Respond,
(notes for Cols 9, 10, 11, & 12)

7

Column 8

From Col 2

Column 13

Safety
Environmental

Year

'What Type of Training Followed?

Event Date

Total Year Human Error Events

Production Loss

Was the event Digital Display related? " X" if yes
Was the event Analog Display related? " X" if yes
Incidence Rate factored by the OSHA 200 Log Formula
Research Group's Recorded incident sequence number

Figure B.01. Data Collection Form
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